The Postfix security model is based on keeping software simple and stupid.
Sentiment: NEGATIVE
I want to avoid locking people into solutions that work only with Postfix. People should have a choice in what software they want to use with Postfix, be it anti-virus or otherwise.
The challenge with Postfix, or with any piece of software, is to update software without introducing problems.
Every time you write an email, it is in the public domain. There are all these ways where security is not as good as people believe.
As of today, the Postfix mail transport agent has almost 50,000 lines of code, comments not included.
At a time when the Post Office is losing substantial revenue from the instantaneous flow of information by email and on the Internet, slowing mail service is a recipe for disaster.
Postfix keeps running even if one Postfix process dies; Windows requires that someone restarts the service.
The ability to send applications by post allows fraudsters to apply in false or stolen identities without fear of arrest and to make multiple applications in the hope of getting one through. It allows the possibility of passports being applied for with the photographs of people who are outside the U.K. and seeking to enter illegally.
I've taken a philosophical position on e-mail. Although I think it's a wonderful communication technology, and it has a lot of good uses, it is abused quite a lot.
Real security will come when it's a moneymaker for private companies who want to satisfy public demand for an Internet that isn't crawling with bugs.
As a result of the digital age and the decline of first-class mail, there is no question that the Postal Service must change and develop a new business model.
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