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Defence was an afterthought, prompted by necessity; and its introduction as a State function, though effected doubtless with a view to the strengthening of the State, was really and in principle the initiation of the State's destruction.

The problem in defense is how far you can go without destroying from within what you are trying to defend from without.

Incentives are not strategy, they are tactics. Defensive measures.

The idea that a war can be won by standing on the defensive and waiting for the enemy to attack is a dangerous fallacy, which owes its inception to the desire to evade the price of victory.

When you have an advantage, you are obliged to attack; otherwise you are endangered to lose the advantage.

Defence must be more adaptable, able to respond quickly to the changes in the security environment and the character of conflict.

Tactics mean doing what you can with what you have.

If you can defend, counter-attack and take the initiative then you become a more dangerous player.

In the years leading up to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, thinking about defense was driven by ideas that regarded successful military operations as ends in themselves rather than just one instrument of power that must be coordinated with others to achieve - and sustain - political goals.

It is the habit of every aggressor nation to claim that it is acting on the defensive.