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The actions taken by central banks and other authorities to stabilize a panic in the short run can work against stability in the long run if investors and firms infer from those actions that they will never bear the full consequences of excessive risk-taking.

I'm very interested in the more grass-roots consequences of the economic meltdown: issues related to mortgage foreclosures, debt collection, and the practices of credit card companies and others who hold a lot of consumer debt.

It is probably the case that some regulation of financing will make crises less likely, and I would say higher capital requirements are an almost fail-safe way to make banks safer. But there are a lot of other things that may not be doing that, and so we need to be careful about sort of, like, rushing to one conclusion or another.

Banks are run by executives, and executives protect themselves, and that does not always mean that banks are going to behave rationally.

Given the extent of the exposures of major banks around the world to A.I.G., and in light of the extreme fragility of the system, there was a significant risk that A.I.G.'s failure could have sparked a global banking panic.

Banks should contribute to the real economy, make a positive contribution to economic growth.

Whether or not you have good consumer protection has a big effect on safety and soundness of the banking community, especially smaller banks.

Banks will have to win the confidence of their customers through fair dealing, making good loans, and remaining financially healthy.

As long as there is cash, and the economy is running, all is well. But as a bank, we'll have to test, experiment, try a hundred different things. A few may work, a few may fail, but we have to experiment and try.

If a bank's too big so that it can't fail without hurting our economy, well then, it's too big.